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Action perception links have been argued to support the emergence of action
understanding, but their role in infants’ perception of distal goals has not been fully
investigated. The current experiments address this issue. During the development of
means-end actions, infants shift their focus from the means of the action to the distal
goal. In Experiment One, we evaluated whether this same shift in attention (from the
means to the distal goal) when learning to produce multi-step actions is reflected in
infants’ perception of others’ means-end actions. Eight-months-old infants underwent
active training in means-end action production and their subsequent analysis of an
observed means-end action was assessed in a visual habituation paradigm. Infants’
degree of success in the training paradigm was related to their subsequent interpretation
of the observed action as directed at the means versus the distal goal. In Experiment
Two, observational and control manipulations provided evidence that these effects
depended on the infants’ active engagement in the means-end actions. These results
suggest that the processes that give rise to means-end structure in infants’ motor
behavior also support the emergence of means-end structure in their analysis of others’
goals.
Keywords: action understanding, action perception links, means-end actions, social cognition, motor learning,
infant cognition
Introduction
Human infants are highly attentive and responsive to their social partners. They are also cogni-
tively engaged with them. Research over the last decade has revealed that infants encode others’
behavior not just as physical motions through space but rather as actions structured by goals (see
Meltzoﬀ, 2007; Woodward et al., 2009 for reviews). This sensitivity to the goal structure of action
is a cornerstone of social cognition, providing the foundation for social learning (Tomasello, 1999;
Baldwin and Moses, 2001) and theory of mind (Wellman et al., 2004, 2008) in early childhood.
Given the importance of infants’ goal sensitivity, recent research has investigated the factors that
support its development during infancy. One insight from this research is the ﬁnding that infants’
own experience acting in goal-directed ways seems to inform their sensitivity to others’ action goals
(e.g., Sommerville et al., 2005, 2008). In the studies reported here, we investigate this process, ask-
ing whether and how infants’ own actions may inform their sensitivity to distal goals in others’
actions.
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At a basic level of analysis, adults understand actions as
directed at the objects that are the proximal targets of the action.
For example, imagine a man reaching across a crowded coun-
tertop to grasp a spoon. Adults view this action as organized
by the relation between the man and the spoon, rather than
in terms of its other perceivable attributes (e.g., the reach tra-
jectory, speed of reach, etc.). Infants perceive this action in the
same manner by the time they are 6 months of age. For example,
when infants in a visual habituation experiment view a repeated
goal-directed action (e.g., a person grasping a toy) they subse-
quently show selective recovery (longer looking) to test events
in which the relation between the person and her goal is dis-
rupted compared to trials on which the person’s movements
diﬀer but her goal remains the same (e.g., Woodward, 1998; Biro
and Leslie, 2006; Brandone and Wellman, 2010; Thoermer et al.,
2013). Infants’ selective attention to the goal structure of oth-
ers’ actions has also been revealed using measures of behavioral
imitation, visual anticipation, and neural activity (e.g., Hamlin
et al., 2008; Southgate et al., 2009; Cannon and Woodward, 2012;
Krogh-Jespersen and Woodward, 2014).
Perceiving meaningful structure in others’ actions requires
more than the ability to encode single actions as goal-directed.
Individual actions are often assembled in service of distal goals,
and when this occurs, a simple action, like grasping a spoon,
can be viewed as directed at a distal goal, such as stirring a
pot of soup or feeding a baby. To analyze these downstream
goals, the perceiver must shift focus from the proximal relations
between agents and the objects they touch, to the distal rela-
tions between agents and their downstream goals. Recent ﬁndings
have shown that infants engage in this kind of action analy-
sis by 12 months of age. In one experiment, Sommerville and
Woodward (2005) habituated 12-months-old infants to events
like the ones depicted in the top panels of Figure 1. A woman
grasped a cloth and pulled it toward her, thereby drawing near
a toy that sat at its far edge. She then grasped the toy. The
question of interest was whether infants viewed the woman’s
actions on the cloth as directed at the cloth or at the toy.
To address this question, Sommerville and Woodward (2005)
showed infants test events in which the toys’ locations were
reversed (see the lower panels of Figure 1) and the woman either
FIGURE 1 | Habituation paradigm used in Sommerville and Woodward (2005) and current experiments.
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reached for the cloth on which she had previously acted which
now held a new toy (new-toy trials), or the other cloth, which
now held the toy she had previously attained (new-cloth trials).
Twelve-months-old infants looked longer at new-toy trials than
new-cloth trials, indicating that they interpreted the woman’s
actions on the cloth as directed at the toy; younger infants, 10-
months-olds, did not respond systematically in this procedure
(see Woodward and Sommerville, 2000; Biro et al., 2011 for
related ﬁndings).
Critically, 12-months-old infants in this experiment
(Sommerville and Woodward, 2005) used the causal struc-
ture of the event to interpret its means-end structure. A control
group of infants was shown events that mimicked the surface
structure of the events depicted in Figure 1, but which diﬀered
in causal structure because the toy sat next to the cloth rather
than on it. In this condition, infants saw the experimenter grasp
the cloth, pull the cloth and then grasp the toy, just as in the
experimental condition. The act of pulling the cloth reliably
preceded and was associated with grasping the toy, but neverthe-
less, infants in this condition did not interpret the cloth-grasp
as directed at the toy (see Woodward and Sommerville, 2000
and Henderson and Woodward, 2011 for similar ﬁndings).
That is, infants analyzed the same action, grasping the cloth,
diﬀerently depending on whether it was causally related to
attaining a distal goal. Thus, by 12 months, but possibly not
before this time, infants are able to look beyond the proxi-
mal connections between agents and objects to discern distal
goals.
Recent ﬁndings indicate that infants’ sensitivity to the goal
structure in others’ actions is correlated with and aﬀected by
their own motor experience. These eﬀects have principally
been documented in studies of infants’ production and per-
ception of simple goal-directed actions, like reaching for a
toy (Sommerville et al., 2005; Kanakogi and Itakura, 2010;
Libertus and Needham, 2010; Daum et al., 2011; Loucks and
Sommerville, 2012; Gerson and Woodward, 2014a,b). For exam-
ple, Sommerville et al. (2005) found that 3-months-old infants
who were trained to use Velcro-covered mittens to apprehend
toys subsequently responded systematically to the goal struc-
ture of another person’s reaching actions, but infants who did
not undergo training did not (see also Libertus and Needham,
2010; Rakison and Krogh, 2011; Gerson and Woodward, 2014a).
These behavioral ﬁndings are also consistent with recent neural
evidence of shared representations between action production
and perception in the brain (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004;
Gerson et al., 2014).
In the case of simple actions, like grasping, motor experi-
ence may yield relatively concrete evidence about the way in
which a particular action is organized with respect to goals. But
understanding downstream goals requires a more ﬂexible anal-
ysis of particular actions as potentially directed at distal goals
rather than their proximal targets. Research regarding the role
of experience in the understanding of means-end actions reﬂects
this challenge. Sommerville andWoodward (2005) reported that,
at 10 months, infants’ skill at solving cloth-pulling problems
correlated with their behavior in the above-described habitua-
tion paradigm: higher skill levels were associated with greater
attention to the relation between the actor and the distal goal
of the observed action, whereas lower levels of skill were associ-
ated with greater attention to the relation between the actor and
the means. To gain clearer evidence as to the causal relations at
play, Sommerville et al. (2008) conducted an intervention study
in which 10-months-old infants were trained to use a cane as a
means to obtain an out of reach toy. They were then tested in a
habituation paradigm analogous to the one depicted in Figure 1.
After being trained to use the cane, infants responded systemati-
cally to the means-end goal structure in the habituation events,
looking longer on new-goal trials than on new-cane trials. In
contrast, infants in control conditions who received no train-
ing or only observational exposure to cane events responded
unsystematically on new-goal and new-cloth trials. Moreover, the
eﬀect in the active training condition was strongest for infants
who had beneﬁtted the most from training in their own actions.
That is, infants who were better at performing the cane-pulling
action at the end of training looked longer to new-goal (rather
than new-cane) events in the habituation paradigm test-trials.
These ﬁndings indicate that success on a means-end task engen-
ders greater sensitivity to distal goals in others’ actions. However,
infants who were less successful in their own means-end actions
responded randomly in the habituation task, rather than showing
heightened attention to the means. Thus, it is not clear from these
ﬁndings how infants perceive others’ means-end actions during
the initial stages of means-end learning.
A closer look at how infants develop the ability to produce
means-end actions could shed light on this early stage of learn-
ing. Infants begin to engage in well-organized means-end actions
by the end of the ﬁrst year. For example, Willatts (1999), follow-
ing on Piaget (1954) classic studies, reported that 8-months-old
infants who were presented with cloth-pulling problems like the
ones in Figure 1 would sometimes produce clearly intentional
solutions to the problem, visually ﬁxating the toy while system-
atically drawing it within reach with the cloth (see also Bates
et al., 1980; Chen et al., 1997; Munakata et al., 2002; Gerson and
Woodward, 2012). Early in the acquisition of ameans-end action,
such as tool use, infants initially focus attention on the tool or
means, rather than the distal goal (Willatts, 1999; Lockman, 2000;
Keen, 2011). Learning to engage in eﬃcient means-end actions
requires exploratory behavior on the tool and the object retrieved
by the tool and manipulating the relations between these two.
Willatts (1999) described this as a transitional progression in
means-end learning: infants ﬁrst focus on the means (i.e., tool)
while they are learning to perform the action and only later shift
their focus to the object being acted upon by the tool. Given these
patterns in infants’ motor development, we might expect parallel
eﬀects on action perception. That is, when infants are at the early
stages of means-end learning, their own attention to the means
may lead them to focus on the relation between the actor and the
means when viewing others’ means-end actions. As they begin
to produce well-organized means-end actions, infants may shift
their attention from the relation between the actor and the tool to
the relation between the actor and the distal goal both for oth-
ers’ actions and their own actions. In the current research, we
examine whether this shift in focus from proximal elements of
means-end problems to the distal goals of these actions seen in
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motor learning is paralleled in infants’ developing understanding
of others’ means-end actions.
In two experiments, we investigate the speciﬁc eﬀects of dif-
ferent levels of motor and observational experience on infants’
analysis of others’ means-end goals. In Experiment 1, we measure
infants’ success in motor training and relate this to their action
perception in a habituation paradigm in order to (1) further test
the hypothesis that learning to engage in well-structured means-
end actions leads to heightened attention to the relation between
an actor and her distal goal, and (2) evaluate whether less success-
ful training leads to heightened attention to the relation between
an actor and the means on which she acts (i.e., the tool she ﬁrst
contacts). To this end, we implemented the approach developed
by Sommerville et al. (2008) in their training condition, but we
used a simpler means-end task (cloth-pulling) and tested younger
infants (8-months-olds) in the hopes of ﬁnding greater variation
in infants’ success following the training. In Experiment 2, we
evaluated infants’ response to habituation events without train-
ing or with observational training as a point of comparison for
the eﬀects seen in Experiment 1.
Experiment One
Participants
Forty-eight 8-months-old infants (M age = 7.87 months; age
range: 7.5–8.4 months) were included in this experiment. Infants
had been born at full term (at least 37 weeks gestation) and
resided in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. All parents
signed a written informed consent sheet that was approved by
the University’s Internal Review Board for this research and were
told their participation in the research was voluntary. Parents
identiﬁed their infants’ racial group membership as follows: 46%
Caucasian, 23%African American, 15%Hispanic, 8%multiracial,
2% Asian, and 6% unreported. Thirty additional infants began the
procedure but were not included in the ﬁnal sample due to exper-
imenter error (n = 10), failure to complete the procedure due
to distress (n = 11), failure to engage in activity during training
(n = 3), parental interference (n = 3), technical errors (n = 2),
or because they had total looking times more than 3 SDs above
the sample mean (n = 1). The attrition rate in this study is on par
with similar paradigms used with infants (e.g., Király et al., 2003;
Hofer et al., 2005; Biro and Leslie, 2006; Southgate et al., 2009).
Procedure
During training, infants sat, on a parent’s lap, at a table adjusted
to a height that allowed them to readily reach for and manip-
ulate objects on its top (see Figure 2). Parents were asked to
hold the infant securely but not to talk to the infant or inﬂu-
ence the infants’ actions in any way. An experimenter sat next
to the infant and a camera facing the infant recorded the session
for later coding. Following training, infants underwent a visual
habituation paradigm designed to assess their understanding of
another person’s means-end action goals.
Active Training
The left panel in Figure 2 depicts the events in the active train-
ing portion of the experiment. In this portion, infants were given
the opportunity to act on a series of problems in which a toy
was placed out of reach on the far side of a cloth that extended
to within the infant’s reach. First, the infant received four pre-
training trials. On these trials, the infant was given the chance to
act on the cloth-pulling problems but was given no guidance for
doing so. The experimenter set up the problem in front of the
infant and then looked down at the table. She drew the infant’s
attention to the cloth if necessary but did not provide more spe-
ciﬁc cues to prompt the infants’ actions. The trial ended when the
infant had obtained the toy or when 30 s had elapsed. Across suc-
cessive pre-training trials, infants were presented with two cloths
and two toys that matched the ones they would later see in the
habituation paradigm. Each cloth was presented with each of the
two toys on separate trials so that each infant was presented with
all possible cloth-toy combinations. The order of presentation of
each toy-cloth pairing was randomized. After pre-training, the
infant received ﬁve training trials. On these trials, the experi-
menter set the cloth and toy in front of herself and then enacted
FIGURE 2 | Training session demonstration and action.
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a means-end solution: She pulled the cloth, watching the toy as it
drew near, and then retrieved the toy, inspecting it and expressing
interest by saying “Ooo” as she did so. The experimenter repeated
these actions twice, and then set up the same problem in front of
the infant, giving the infant a chance to respond without further
prompting, as on pre-training trials. Each of the ﬁve training tri-
als involved a unique cloth-toy combination that diﬀered from
the items used during pre-training. Finally, the infant received
four post-training trials, which were identical to pre-training
trials. Throughout training, infants received no hands-on guid-
ance from the experimenter or parent. All successfully completed
sequences were performed by the infant him or herself.
Coding of Infants’ Actions
The training session was coded for the extent to which infants
engaged in well-structured solutions. Infants’ actions were scored
as planful if the infant maintained visual contact with the toy
while pulling the cloth in one continuous movement and then
retrieved or touched the toy within 3 s of the completion of
the pull (see Willatts, 1999; Sommerville and Woodward, 2005).
Two independent coders, each unaware of the infants’ responses
in the visual habituation portion of the experiment, coded each
infant’s actions. The two coders agreed on infants’ planfulness
on 88% of trials (cohen’s κ = 0.76). Additional frame-by-frame
coding of attention to the experimenter’s actions during train-
ing trials was assessed using a digital video coding program
(Mangold, 1998). Coders measured the length of time infants
attended to each aspect of the event (cloth, toy, or experimenter)
during each portion of the pulling action (prior to touching
the cloth, during the pull of the cloth, and during the grasp of
the toy; reliability on duration of looking between two coders:
rs> 0.95).
Habituation and Test
After the training procedure, infants were brought to a second
testing room, equipped for the visual habituation procedure.
Infants sat on a parent’s lap facing a small stage 72 cm away. On
the stage sat two cloths, side by side, on a table-top surface that
sloped slightly down toward the infant (so as to be easily visible
but not to cause objects to slide down the slope; see Figure 1).
Each cloth supported a diﬀerent toy (a frog or a duck). A pre-
senting experimenter (henceforth, the presenter) sat behind the
stage, facing the infant. A screen was raised to hide the stage
from view between trials. Parents were instructed not to talk
and to look down at the infant rather than at the experimental
events. A camera mounted below the stage ﬁlmed infants as they
watched the events. An observer in another room watched the
infant on a video monitor and coded the infant’s attention using
a program that calculated looking times and habituation criteria
(Casstevens, 2007). The observer could not see the experimental
events and was not informed of the condition to which the infant
had been assigned or the order of test trials.
At the start of each trial, the screen was lowered to reveal the
stage and the presenter drew the infant’s attention by saying “Hi”
and making eye contact. During habituation trials, the presenter
proceeded to look down toward one of the toys, pulled the cloth
toward herself and then reached toward and grasped the toy that
had been drawn near. She remained still in this position, look-
ing at the toy, until the trial ended. Infants’ attention to the event
was calculated beginning as soon as the presenter had stopped
moving and the trial continued until the infant had looked away
for 2 consecutive seconds. When the trial ended, the screen was
raised, the cloth was returned to its original position, and then the
screen was lowered for the presentation of the next habituation
trial. Across habituation trials, the actor consistently reached for
the same cloth and toy on the same side of the table. Habituation
trials were continued until the infant’s attention, summed over
three consecutive trials, had declined to 50% of its initial level or
for 14 trials.
Following habituation, the screen was raised and the positions
of the toys on the cloths were reversed. Then the screen was low-
ered to allow infants to view the toys in their new positions for
an infant-controlled familiarization trial. During this familiariza-
tion trial, the presenter looked down and did not look toward
the stimuli. After this, the test trials were presented. On test tri-
als, after saying “Hi” the presenter turned to grasp the near edge
of one of the two cloths and look toward the toy at the end of
the cloth. She then held still in this position for the duration of
the trial, which was infant-controlled, as during habituation. It
is important to note that, unlike in the habituation trials, during
test trials the presenter never moved the cloth or touched the toy
(matching the procedure used in Sommerville and Woodward,
2005). On new-goal trials, she grasped the same cloth that she had
acted on during habituation, which now supported a new toy at
its far end. On new-cloth trials she grasped the cloth she had not
acted on during habituation, which held her prior goal toy at its
far end. Three new-goal and new-cloth trials were presented in
alternation. The type of test trial seen ﬁrst, the side to which the
presenter reached during habituation, and the toy that was the
presenter’s goal during habituation were counterbalanced across
infants.
Each infant’s video session was coded after the fact by a sec-
ond independent observer. The online and reliability observers
were counted as agreeing if they agreed on the point at which the
infant looked away to end the trial. The two observers agreed on
the endpoints of 95% of test trials. To evaluate potential observer
bias, all disagreements were categorized as those that would indi-
cate bias in favor of the hypothesis on the part of the on-line
coder versus those that would indicate bias against the hypothesis.
The observers’ disagreements were randomly distributed (Fisher’s
Exact Test, ns).
Results
Training Session: Assessment of Quality of Motor
Training
Coding of infants’ attention to the experimenter’s actions dur-
ing training trials indicated that infants attended to the relevant
aspect of the action during the majority of the experimenter’s
actions throughout training trials. That is, they attended to the
cloth during the pulling action (90% of the time on average) and
to the toy and experimenter during the grasping action (83% of
the time on average).
On the 13 training trials (including pre- and post-training
trials), infants produced planful actions on an average of 6.40
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(SEM = 0.51) trials overall. As shown in Figure 3, infants
increased their planfulness from pre- to post-training trials. A
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the propor-
tion of planful actions in the pre-training, training, and post-
training trials revealed a signiﬁcant increase in planful actions
across these phases, F(2,45) = 18.13, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.45.
Pairwise comparisons of the estimated marginal means indicated
that infants’ planfulness increased signiﬁcantly from pre-training
to training (mean diﬀerence = 0.23, SEM = 0.048; p < 0.001)
and from training to post-training (mean diﬀerence = 0.14,
SEM= .05; p= 0.013). Age did not correlate reliably with infants’
degree of planfulness in any of the three phases or with infants’
degree of improvement from pre-training to post-training (all
rs< 0.12, ps > 0.42). Thus, the active training procedure reliably
increased the extent to which infants engaged in well-organized
means-end actions. Even so, infants’ responses to training varied.
Only half of the infants were highly planful after training—25
of the 48 infants achieved planful scores on 3 or 4 out of the 4
post-training trials. Thus, a median split of planfulness (Quality
of Training) corresponded with a theoretically meaningful cutoﬀ.
Planful and unplanful infants did not diﬀer from one another
in age (p = 0.89). We further assessed whether planful and
unplanful infants diﬀered in their general attention to assure that
unplanful infants were not simply less alert in general. Infants
in the two groups did not diﬀer in amount of attention (i.e., the
length of looking to each trial) at the beginning (p = 0.33) or end
of habituation trials (p = 0.98). Further, the number of habitu-
ation trials needed to reach habituation criterion (often thought
of as a measure of speed of processing and known to be related
to later intelligence; Fagan, 1992) did not diﬀer between the two
groups (p = 0.38). Planful and unplanful infants did not diﬀer
in overall amount of attention during test trials (collapsed across
two diﬀerent kinds of test-trials) during test-trials (p = 0.39).
Finally, we also assessed infants’ attention during the training ses-
sion in order to assure that infants had the same opportunity
to learn from training trials. Infants in the two groups spent
FIGURE 3 | Infants in the active condition increased in planfulness
from pre-training to post-training (box plot median, quartiles,
minimum, and maximum proportion of trials within each portion of
training that infants were planful) ∗p < 0.02.
comparable amounts of time attending to the relevant aspects of
the experimenter’s actions during training trials during both the
pulling (p= 0.24) and grasping (p= 0.33) portions of training tri-
als. Across groups, no signiﬁcant correlation was found between
attention to relevant aspects of training and post-training plan-
fulness (rs < 0.23, ps > 0.13). Thus, there was no evidence that
variations in infants’ attentiveness during the procedure, or in
their age, accounted for their ability to beneﬁt from training (see
Table 1 for a summary of means and SDs). Subsequent analyses
took the variation in the extent to which infants beneﬁted from
training into account, as described below.
Habituation Session: Relative Attention to Cloth and
Goal Relations
Preliminary analyses assessed infants’ attention during the habit-
uation trials. A repeated measures ANOVA with habituation trial
(the ﬁrst three and last three trials for each infant) as the repeated
measure revealed a main eﬀect of trial, F(1,47)= 65.11, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.58, reﬂecting a decline in attention across trials. Infants
required ∼9 trials on average to reach habituation criteria.1
The focal analysis concerned infants’ diﬀerential attention to
the change in relation between the agent and the means she used
(i.e., new-cloth test events) or her distal goal (i.e., new-goal test
events) and whether diﬀerential responses to these test events var-
ied as a function of the success of training. A repeated-measures
ANOVA was conducted with average looking time to the new-
goal and new-cloth events as the repeated measure (Type). In
order to take into account the variability in training success,
a median split of infants’ planfulness at the end of training
(Training Success) was included as a between-subjects factor. As
discussed above, approximately half of the infants were successful
in planfully carrying out the means-end action in at least three of
the four post-training trials and these two groups did not diﬀer
in age, attention during habituation, or attention during train-
ing trials. This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant Type X Training
Success interaction, F(1,46) = 14.50, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.24. The
main eﬀects of Type and Training Success were not signiﬁcant
(Fs < 0.75)2. Pairwise comparisons of the estimated marginal
means (see Figure 4 for raw means and standard errors) revealed
that infants below the median in planfulness at post-training
looked signiﬁcantly longer to new-cloth than to new-goal tri-
als (mean diﬀerence = 2.66, SEM = 0.96; p = 0.008) whereas
infants above the median in planfulness looked signiﬁcantly
longer to new-goal than new-cloth trials (mean diﬀerence= 2.43,
SEM = 0.92; p = 0.012).
Relations Between Training Success and Action
Perception
Given the diﬀerences found based on the success of train-
ing as reﬂected in the median split of post-training activity
1Four infants reached 14 habituation trials without meeting the habituation cri-
terion. When these infants were removed from the sample, the principle ﬁndings
were unchanged. Therefore the analyses are reported for the full sample.
2We conducted this critical analysis with a randomly selected subset of 24 sub-
jects (in order to match the sample size of infants in the observational and control
conditions of Experiment 2) and saw a nearly identical pattern: Type X Training
success: F(1,22)= 10.20, p = 0.004; no signiﬁcant main eﬀects (Fs< 2.70).
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TABLE 1 | Similarity in infants’ attentional patterns across active groups.
Age Attn to beg
of Hab
Attn to end
of Hab
# of Hab
trials
Total attn to
test trials
Pre-training
planfulness
Attn to pull
(in training)
Attn to grasp
(in training)
Below median
planful M(SEM)
7.86 mos
(0.06)
46.69 s
(6.83)
14.04 s
(1.87)
8.35
(0.58)
40.66 s (4.91) 0.23 (0.06) 2.48 s (0.09) 2.33 s
(0.15)
Above median
planful M(SEM)
7.85 mos
(0.05)
39.08 s
(3.54)
13.97 s
(1.39)
9.08
(0.59)
35.39 s (3.74) 0.33 (0.06) 2.63 s (0.07) 2.53 s
(0.14)
t-test p-value 0.89 0.33 0.98 0.38 0.39 0.24 0.33 0.36
FIGURE 4 | Mean looking times SEs to test-trial events across
conditions ∗p < 0.02.
(training success), we further explored the relation between plan-
fulness in diﬀerent phases of training and looking time dif-
ferences in the habituation paradigm. Infants’ planfulness in
post-training was unrelated to their planfulness in pre-training
(r = 0.15, p = 0.32), suggesting that individual diﬀerences in
post-training planfulness were not a function of motor abilities
prior to training. We also examined whether attention to diﬀer-
ent aspects of the experimenter’s actions during training trials
related to infants’ new-goal preference in the habituation phase,
but no aspect of attention was signiﬁcantly related (rs < 0.24,
ps > 0.11).
To examine the unique contribution of pre versus post-
training on infants’ diﬀerential looking to new- versus old-goal
test events, we performed a hierarchical multiple regression anal-
ysis. For each infant, we calculated a diﬀerence score reﬂecting his
or her relative visual preference for new-goal trials compared to
new-cloth trials (average looking time on new-goal trials minus
average looking time on new-cloth trials; see Sommerville et al.,
2005 for a similar measure) and entered this as the dependent
variable. Pre- and post-training planfulness were entered in two
steps. In step 1, pre-training planfulness was the independent
variable. In step 2, post-training planfulness was added to the step
1 equation.
The results of step 1 indicated that the variance accounted
for by pre-training planfulness was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero (see Table 2). Adding post-training planfulness as a
predictor signiﬁcantly improved the model; post-training plan-
fulness was positively related to new-goal preference (B = 0.15),
TABLE 2 | Hierarchical multiple regression: effect of post-training
planfulness on new-goal preference.
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 0.51∗∗ 0.42∗∗
Pre-training planfulness 0.02 –0.01
Post-training
planfulness
0.15∗
Adjusted R2 –0.022 0.054
Model F 0.021 2.31
Change R2 <0.001 0.95∗
Incremental F 4.6∗
∗p = 0.037, ∗∗p < 0.001.
whereas pre-training planfulness was unrelated (B = −0.01).
Thus, infants’ learning from the training session (as evidenced in
post-training planfulness), rather than their starting means-end
abilities, predicted their subsequent responses to the observed
actions in the habituation paradigm.
Discussion
The ﬁndings of Experiment 1 converge with those of
Sommerville et al. (2008) in showing that training in a means-end
action supports infants’ sensitivity to others’ means-end actions.
Infants who beneﬁted from means-end training, in that they
became able to organize their own actions in service of a distal
goal, subsequently responded to the higher-order goal structure
of another person’s means-end actions. Extending beyond the
ﬁndings of Sommerville et al. (2008), the current ﬁndings also
indicate that infants who were less successful in organizing their
means-end actions attended, instead, to the relation between the
observed agent and the means she acted on initially (the cloth).
Importantly, there was no evidence that infants who did less
well in organizing their own actions were less alert, attentive,
or engaged than infants who were more successful. Further,
both planful and unplanful infants responded systematically
on test trials, showing that they had encoded and remembered
the habituation events. The diﬀerences in infants’ responses to
the test events were not predicted by infants’ ability to perform
the task prior to training, but rather were predicted by infants’
skill following training. Thus, the diﬀerential ﬁndings based on
planfulness seemed to reﬂect infants’ experiences during the
training phase, rather than diﬀerential abilities they brought with
them into the laboratory.
The coding scheme by which infants’ actions were identiﬁed
as planful gives some clues as to the reason infants who did
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not beneﬁt showed a bias toward interpreting the means-end
action as directed at the simple one-action-step goal (i.e., the
cloth). Action task trials in which the infant looked at the cloth
during a pull rather than the toy or in which the child pulled
the cloth but then failed to retrieve the toy within a short
amount of time were qualiﬁed as unplanful (and the child often
did not attain the toy at the end of the trial). Those infants
who produced more of these actions during training may have
spent more time attending to the cloth than other infants in
that they concentrated their attention on the cloth in service of
attempting to successfully coordinate their actions on the cloth.
These patterns are consistent with developmental patterns in
infant motor development: When initially learning new actions,
infants seem ﬁrst to attend to the means of the action and as
they gain proﬁciency, they shift attention to the goal (Willatts,
1999).
Our ﬁndings raise the question of why infants varied in their
learning from the training manipulation. This variation was not
accounted for by age. It is likely instead that infants’ ability to
beneﬁt from motor training depended on their existing motor
abilities and developmental readiness for learning (see Piaget,
1954; Lockman, 2000; Keen, 2011). The current ﬁndings do not
provide evidence for fully evaluating this issue. Further research
is needed to investigate the developmental predictors of motor
learning and their relation to generalizing motor information to
the perception of others’ actions.
What is it that self-produced experience provided for infants
in this experiment? One interesting possibility is they learned
about the goal of the action through simply observing their
own actions. We know that infants this age can learn about
the goals of tool-use actions without active experience organiz-
ing their own actions on tools in certain circumstances (see,
for example, Gerson and Woodward, 2012, 2014c). On the
other hand, there is reason to think that the act of produc-
ing an action, rather than simply observing it, may be par-
ticularly informative because it yields shared action perception
representations.
Recent research has investigated the unique eﬀects of active,
relative to observational, experience on action perception
(Sommerville et al., 2008; Gerson andWoodward, 2014a; Gerson
et al., 2014), face perception (Libertus and Needham, 2011, 2014),
and spatial perception (Frick and Wang, 2014). If the mirror sys-
tem plays a role in the link between motor experience and action
perception (see Hunnius and Bekkering, 2014; Woodward and
Gerson, 2014, for discussion), beneﬁts should (at least initially) be
unique to active experience as this widens the motor repertoire of
the infant.
Accordingly, recent studies have examined the eﬀects of
observational experience with novel actions in training stud-
ies with infants matching those described above. Gerson and
Woodward (2014a) found that active, but not observational,
training with reaching actions led 3-months-old infants to rec-
ognize the goal of a grasping action in a habituation paradigm.
Similarly, Sommerville et al. (2008) included an observational
training condition in their means-end training experiment, in
which 10-months-old infants watched an experimenter produce
planful actions using the same canes and for the same number
of trials as infants in the active training condition. Infants in
this condition did not respond systematically in the habitua-
tion paradigm. Thus, these ﬁndings indicate that self-produced
actions provide stronger support for viewing others’ actions
as goal-directed than do observed actions. In the Sommerville
et al. (2008) experiment, all infants in the observational condi-
tion received a set amount of experience observing means-end
actions (the mean of that produced by actively trained infants),
so eﬀects of variability in the amount of observational experi-
ence received could not be assessed (but see Sommerville et al.,
2011).
In Experiment 2, we matched the amount of experience
watching means-end actions to that of a yoked infant in
the active condition from Experiment 1. Given the diﬀeren-
tial eﬀects of training found in Experiment 1, we aimed to
examine whether diﬀerent amounts of observational experi-
ence would diﬀerentially inﬂuence action perception. That is,
would the amount of observational experience received inﬂu-
ence infants’ relative attention to the relation between the actor
and the means or goal of her actions, as it did in Experiment
1? This matched variability allows us to assess potential cor-
relations between observed activity and action perception. We
also included a control condition in which infants had the
chance to explore each cloth and toy prior to the habitua-
tion paradigm but never got to act on one in relation to the
other and did not observe this action prior to the habituation
paradigm. This allowed us to compare observational experience
with infants’ action perception when they received no means-end
training.
Experiment Two
Participants
Forty-eight 8-months-old infants (M age = 7.9 months; age
range: 7.27–8.43 months) participated in one of two conditions
in this experiment: observational or control. Infants had been
born at full term (at least 37 weeks gestation) and resided in
the Washington,DC, metropolitan area. Parents identiﬁed their
infants’ racial group membership as follows: 60% Caucasian, 3%
Asian, 17% African American, 10% Hispanic, and 10% multira-
cial. Twenty-nine additional infants began the procedure but
were not included in the ﬁnal sample due to experimenter error
(n = 13), failure to complete the procedure due to distress
(n = 12), parental interference (n = 1), or because they had total
looking times more than 3 SDs above the sample mean (n = 3).
Procedure
Infants underwent a “training” period prior to participation in
the habituation paradigm. During this session, as in Experiment
One, infants sat on a parent’s lap at a table adjusted to a
height that allowed them to readily reach for and manipu-
late objects on its top. Parents were asked to hold the infant
securely but not to talk to the infant or inﬂuence the infants’
actions in any way. An experimenter sat next to the infant
and a camera facing the infant recorded the session for later
coding.
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Observational Training
Infants in the observational condition were shown the same series
of cloth-pulling problems as infants in the active condition from
Experiment One, but they observed the experimenter solving
each problem and were not given the opportunity to act on the
toys themselves. To equate, as much as possible, the duration of
training in this condition to the amount of experience received in
the active condition from Experiment One, the duration of each
trial for infants in the active condition was coded, and the session
from each infant in the active condition was used to generate a
script for an infant in the observational condition that speciﬁed
the duration of each observation trial. Because the experimenter’s
actions were generally more well-organized than those of the
infants, this meant that the experimenter sometimes repeated the
problem several times in order to keep the infant engaged for
the full trial duration. Thus, infants in the observational con-
dition had equivalent durations of exposure to the problems as
did infants in the active condition from Experiment One, and
they viewed more instances of well-organized solutions than did
infants in the active condition (see below for details).
Control “Training”
Infants in the control condition were given the opportunity to
explore each cloth and each toy that were involved in the active
and observational training, but they saw each cloth and each toy
presented independently (i.e., sequentially), rather than in the
context of a means-end problem. The order of presentation par-
alleled the order in the active and observational conditions, with
infants ﬁrst being given each of the four items involved in the pre-
and post-training phase for 15 s each, then each of the 10 items
from the training phase for 30 s each, and then the four pre- and
post-training items again for 15 s each.
Coding of Training Session
Videos of the observational condition were coded for infants’
attention during each phase of the experimenter’s movements–
grasping the cloth, pulling the cloth, and retrieving the toy—to
identify the number of complete means-end actions that each
infant viewed. To assess reliability, a second independent coder
coded the sessions for 25% of infants. The two coder’s judgments
of the number of planful actions infants observed in each phase
of the training session were highly correlated, r = 0.99. As in the
training trials from Experiment One, additional frame-by-frame
coding of attention to the experimenter’s actions during observa-
tional training was assessed using a digital video coding program
(Mangold, 1998; reliability: rs> 0.95).
Habituation and Test
The habituation procedure in this experiment was identical to
that of Experiment One. Reliability of the online coders was
assessed and coders agreed on the end of the trials for 94%
of test trials (cohen’s κ = 0.88). To evaluate potential observer
bias, all disagreements were categorized as those that would indi-
cate bias in favor of the hypothesis on the part of the on-line
coder versus those that would indicate bias against the hypothesis.
The observers’ disagreements were randomly distributed (Fisher’s
Exact Test, ns).
Results
Training Session: Assessment of Amount of
Observational Training
In the observational condition, we examined the number of
planful pulls observed by each infant. Because the experimenter
repeated planful pulls for the duration of each trial in the observa-
tional condition, infants in this condition had the opportunity to
view more planful actions than infants in Experiment One pro-
duced (mean number of planful pulls in Experiment One was
6.4, ranging from 0 to 12). Coding of infants’ attention to the
pulls revealed that infants in the observational condition viewed
24 planful pulls on average (range = 16–29). Further, frame-by-
frame coding of infants’ attention to the experimenter’s actions
indicated that they attended to the relevant aspect of the action
the majority of the time: to the cloth during pulling actions
(88% of the time) and to the toy and experimenter during the
grasping action (77% of the time). Infants in the observational
condition did not diﬀer from infants in the active condition
from Experiment One in their attention to any of these aspects
(ps > 0.10).
Habituation Session: Relative Attention to Cloth and
Goal Relations
Preliminary analyses assessed infants’ attention during the habit-
uation trials. A repeated-measures ANOVA with the ﬁrst three
and last three trials of habituation as repeated measures and con-
dition (observational versus control) as a between subjects factor
revealed a main eﬀect indicating a signiﬁcant decrease in atten-
tion across conditions, F(1,46) = 97.04, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.68,
no interaction between condition and trials (p > 0.57), and no
main eﬀect of condition (p > 0.49). When the active condi-
tion from Experiment One was included in this analysis there
was again no interaction between condition and trial. Infants
in Experiment Two habituated in approximately eight trials on
average.
The main analysis concerned whether infants in either the
observational or control condition showed preferential looking
to the new-goal or new-cloth test-trials and whether they dif-
fered from each other and/or infants in the active condition from
Experiment 1 who weremore or less planful at the end of training.
We ﬁrst examined only the infants in the control and observa-
tional conditions (see Figure 4). A repeated-measures ANOVA
with test-trial type as the repeated measure (new-goal or new-
cloth) and condition as the between subjects factor (observational
or control) revealed no main eﬀect of Type [F(1,46) = 1.58,
p = 0.22, η2p = 0.03] and no interaction between Condition and
Type [F(1,46) = 0.51, p = 0.48, η2p = 0.01]. A main eﬀect of con-
dition [F(1,46)= 7.10, p= 0.01, η2p = 0.13) indicated that infants
in the control condition looked longer across test trials than did
infants in the observational condition.
Relations Between Amount of Training and Action
Perception
As a measure of experience in the observational condition, we
also examined whether the number of planful pulls observed dif-
ferentially inﬂuenced looking times to diﬀerent test trials. As a
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measure of the possible continuous relation between experience
observing planful pulls and new-goal preference (as found in
Experiment 1), we calculated the diﬀerence between average new-
goal and new-cloth (average diﬀerence) trials and examined its
relation to number of pulls observed. No signiﬁcant relation was
found (r = 0.085, p= 0.69). As in Experiment One, we also exam-
ined whether any aspect of attention to the experimenter’s actions
during training trials related to new-goal preference in the habit-
uation paradigm. No signiﬁcant relations were found (rs < 0.28,
ps > 0.20).
Because the number of pulls presented (and thus the max-
imum possible number to observe) was randomly assigned to
infants based on scripts from activity of infants in Experiment
One, we also took into account individual diﬀerences created by
the infants themselves by dividing the number of trials observed
by the number of trials presented. On average, infants observed
89% of the actions produced by the experimenter (range: 63–
100%). The relation between proportion of pulls observed and
new-goal preference was not signiﬁcant (r = −0.25, p = 0.24).
As in Experiment 1, we created a median split of experi-
ence (Amount of Training: more or fewer than 15 planful pulls
observed). In order to compare the eﬀects of experience in
the observational condition with infants from the active con-
dition in Experiment One directly, we conducted a repeated-
measures ANOVA with test-trial type as the repeated mea-
sure and condition (active or observational) and Amount of
Training as between subjects factors. This revealed no main
eﬀects of Type (F < 0.05, p > 0.85), Condition (F < 1.4,
p > 0.24), or Amount of Training (F < 1.3, p > 0.27), and
no interaction between Type and Condition [F(1,68) = 0.16,
p = 0.69, η2p = 0.002]. A signiﬁcant interaction between
Type and Amount of Training [F(1,68) = 5.74, p = 0.019,
η2p = 0.078] was qualiﬁed by a three-way interaction between
Type, Condition, and Amount of Training [F(1,68) = 5.67,
p= 0.02, η2p = 0.077]. Comparisons of estimatedmarginal means
again revealed that the three-way interaction was a function
of the signiﬁcant eﬀect of Type that was in opposite direc-
tions for infants above and below the median in active expe-
rience in Experiment One (as described above; ps ≤ 0.005)
but no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between Type in either infants
above (estimated marginal means for new-cloth trials, 5.69.
SEM = 1.24, and new-goal trials, 6.00. SEM = 1.16) or
below the median in experience (estimated marginal means
for new-cloth trials, 4.82. SEM = 1.05, and new-goal trials,
5.12. SEM = 0.98) in the observational condition (mean diﬀer-
ences< 0.32, ps > 0.79).
Given the lack of eﬀects of experience in the observational
condition and the lack of diﬀerence between observational and
control conditions, we then collapsed across these conditions
to examine whether responses in the habituation paradigm dif-
fered between these conditions and the more and less plan-
ful infants from the active condition in Experiment One. We
conducted a univariate ANOVA with proportion of attention
to the new-goal test trials (new-goal)/(new-goal + new-cloth)
as the dependent variable and condition group (active-high,
active-low, or observational and control) as the between-subjects
factor. The condition groups signiﬁcantly diﬀered from one
another in new-goal preference [F(1,2) = 5.72, p = 0.005,
η2p = 0.11], and we followed up with planned comparisons
between conditions. Pairwise comparisons of the estimated
marginal means indicated that infants in the observational and
control conditions had signiﬁcantly higher new-goal preferences
than unplanful infants in the active condition (mean diﬀer-
ence = 0.08, SEM = 0.04, p = 0.03) and had marginally lower
new-goal preferences than planful infants in the active con-
dition (mean diﬀerence = 0.06, SEM = 0.04, p = 0.095; see
Figure 4).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 did not reveal eﬀects of observa-
tional experience with means-end on infants’ action perception.
This result is consistent with ﬁndings indicating that observation
of means-end training is not as beneﬁcial as active training at
10 months of age (Sommerville et al., 2008). In this experiment,
we expanded on prior research to explore individual diﬀerences
in the amount of observational experience received. Given the
importance of the amount of planful actions produced in the
active condition in Experiment 1, we allowed infants the oppor-
tunity to observe planful actions for the same range of time as
infants in the active condition. This way of matching infants
meant that infants in the observational condition experienced
more instances of well-formed, planful actions than did infants
in the active condition. Even so, infants in the observational con-
dition did not demonstrate a beneﬁt from training at a group
level or show any of the same patterns of individual diﬀerences
as infants in Experiment 1.
It is important to note that the diﬀerence in eﬀects between
conditions cannot be due to a diﬀerence in opportunities to
observe or infant attentiveness. In creating yoked observational
scripts, we erred on the side of allowing infants in the observa-
tional condition to viewmore demonstrations than their partners
in the active condition. Infants in the observational condition
always saw more planful actions during the training phase than
their matched partner in the active condition from Experiment
1 (in fact, infants in this condition saw almost four times more
exemplars of the cloth-pulling action than their active train-
ing counterparts). They attended to cloth-pulling actions for as
long as infants in the active condition and thus received equal
exposure to the toys and cloths. The physical causal informa-
tion (pulling the cloth makes the toy move) was identical to
infants across the active and observational conditions. Looking
times during both the habituation and test phases of the look-
ing time procedure did not indicate any diﬀerences in overall
attention to the events between the two studies. Additionally, the
patterns found in the active condition were a result of attention to
a speciﬁc relation between particular actions, means, and objects,
rather than general attention to the event or a particular toy or
cloth.
Despite controlling for attention, there may be other dif-
ferences in readiness to learn that we could not assess in our
observational condition. The yoking procedure we used ran-
domly assigned infants in the observational condition to a script
duration based on an active infants’ timing. It is possible that
seeing a greater number of demonstrations at a faster rate than
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infants in the active condition could have hindered some infants’
ability to make sense of the viewed action, but we had no way
to take into consideration the length of time that each individual
infant in the observational condition may have needed to bene-
ﬁt from observation. Thus, it is possible that infants tested under
conditions in which readiness to learn is taken into consideration
may show greater beneﬁts from observation.
Critically, however, the design of the current experiment par-
allels a real-world diﬀerence between active and observational
learning. In active learning, infants’ experience is self-generated
and thus can be readily calibrated to their current learning state
(e.g., infants can continue to act on the world until they have all
the information that they need to learn relevant information). In
contrast, when learning via observation, infants are at the behest
of the caregiver, adult or more advanced peer who is doing the
demonstrating. During observational learning, it is the demon-
strator that decides how much information to give infants and
for how long; given that demonstrators do not have direct access
to infants’ knowledge base or learning state (although infants
may provide implicit cues to this state), information accrued
via observation may be less well suited to an infant’s learning
state than is information accrued via active learning. Indeed,
this distinction between active and observational learning may
be one of the factors driving the potential beneﬁts of active ver-
sus observational learning. Future work can directly assess this
possibility.
The observational and control conditions provided a point of
comparison for the active training groups, allowing us to examine
whether both the low and high planful groups diﬀered from how
infants might respond to the habituation events spontaneously.
The fact that both groups of active infants diﬀered from the
observational and control conditions in opposite directions sug-
gests that initial, unsuccessful attempts at means-end problems
push attention to the proximal agent-means relation whereas
more successful training pushes attention to the distal agent-goal
relation.
General Discussion
Prior ﬁndings have shown that active motor experience aﬀects
infants’ sensitivity to the goal structure of others’ simple actions
(Sommerville et al., 2005; Gerson and Woodward, 2014a,b). Our
question, in the current studies, was whether active motor expe-
rience also supports infants’ emerging sensitivity to others’ distal
goals. Understanding distal goals requires that the perceiver look
beyond the actor’s immediate motor interactions in order to
consider his or her potential distal goals, and this raises the
question of whether and how concrete motor experiences could
contribute to this aspect of goal analysis. Our ﬁndings provide
evidence that active motor experience supports infants’ analysis
of distal goals, and further, provide new insight into the inﬂu-
ence of infants’ motor experiences on their analysis of others’
actions.
In the current experiments, infants saw a chain of interrelated
actions in the habituation trials of the looking time paradigm.
The presenter ﬁrst reached for and grasped a cloth. After pulling
on it, she then reached for and grasped the toy at the end of
the cloth. Test trials assessed whether infants viewed the exper-
imenter’s actions on the cloth as directed at the cloth itself, or
instead as directed at the toy. The ﬁndings of Experiment 1
indicated that infants’ active experience in a cloth-pulling task
predicted which of these interpretations they adopted. Infants
who beneﬁted from training and became highly organized in
their own actions viewed the experimenter’s action on the cloth
as directed at the toy. Infants who were less successful in their
training activities viewed her actions as directed at the cloth.
Compared to infants in Experiment 2, who underwent observa-
tional training or no training, infants in Experiment 1 showed
systematic diﬀerences in each response pattern. Thus, at a ﬁrst
level of analysis, the current ﬁndings contribute support to the
conclusion that infants’ interpretation of distal goals is inﬂuenced
by their own motor experience (Sommerville and Woodward,
2005; Sommerville et al., 2008).
The current ﬁndings go beyond prior work in demonstrating
that variation in infants’ success in means-end activities leads to
systematic variation in their analysis of others’ actions. Infants
who beneﬁted from active training showed the higher-level inter-
pretation of the events in the habituation paradigm, consistent
with ﬁndings from older infants (Sommerville et al., 2008). But
infants who engaged in ineﬀective means-end actions showed just
the opposite response, interpreting the observed actions in terms
of the proximal goal (the cloth) rather than the distal goal. These
distinct patterns of response mirror the patterns that occur dur-
ing developments in infants’ own means-end actions (Willatts,
1999). This result suggests that the processes that give rise to
means-end structure in infants’ motor behavior also support the
emergence of means-end structure in their analysis of others’
goals.
We can conclude, then, that there is a speciﬁc relation between
organizing means-end action toward the goal and understand-
ing others’ means-end actions as organized toward a goal. The
individual diﬀerences found in Experiment 1 suggest that infants
may at ﬁrst concentrate and learn about the means of a multi-
step action and then change their focus to the goal once they
gain proﬁciency with a new action. Active experience seems to
focus infants’ attention on relevant relations and, depending on
the nature of their own actions, this could be the relation between
the cloth (i.e., proximal goal) and the agent or the goal (i.e., distal
goal) and the agent.
Importantly, this shift in focus was not seen in Experiment
2, when infants observed an adult engage in repeated, well-
structured means-end actions, nor was there any indication that
variations in observational experience related to variations in
infants’ responses to the habituation events. Infants’ failure to
beneﬁt from the observational training is striking. In the obser-
vational training, infants were witness to critical information
about the goal-structure of the cloth-pulling action. They viewed
the causal relation between acting on the cloth and attain-
ing the toy, and they saw the experimenter express interest
in the toy. Infants were highly attentive to these events, and
yet seemed not to recover meaningful information from them
regarding the goal structure of cloth-pulling events. This ﬁnding,
in conjunction with previous research (Sommerville et al., 2008;
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Gerson and Woodward, 2014a), suggests that active experi-
ence provides a particularly potent, and possibly unique, source
of evidence for understanding others’ actions during early
development.
Even so, open questions remain concerning the nature
of the beneﬁt conferred by active experience. It is possi-
ble that self-produced actions yield information about goal
structure that infants cannot glean from observation alone.
Alternatively, it remains possible that infants can glean goal
information from observational experience, but were unable
to demonstrate it given the demands of the current task. The
training and habituation sessions were conducted in diﬀerent
rooms and involved diﬀerent people, and infants have diﬃ-
culty carrying goal information across contexts (Sommerville and
Crane, 2009). Thus, active experience may create particularly
robust or “portable” representations, as compared to observa-
tional experience (see Gerson and Woodward, 2010 for further
discussion).
The current ﬁndings indicate that infants’ own actions ren-
der changes in their sensitivity to the goal structure of others’
actions. Recent ﬁndings in infants (van Elk et al., 2008; Southgate
et al., 2009; Saby et al., 2012; Gerson et al., 2014; Cannon et al.,
2015) suggest that the motor system is active during, and may
play a role in, infants’ perception of others’ actions. Although the
current ﬁndings do not provide direct evidence concerning the
neural mechanisms at work, they raise the question of whether
shared neurocognitive representations support infants’ analysis
of higher-order goals. Mirror neurons in primates and mirror
systems in humans are modulated, not only by the goals of sim-
ple actions, but also by overarching goals that structure action
sequences (Fogassi et al., 2005; Iacoboni et al., 2005). For example,
Fogassi et al. (2005) found mirror neurons in macaque monkeys
that ﬁred diﬀerentially to grasping actions that preceded eating
versus placing of the grasped object when there were contex-
tual cues to support one of these two analyses of the grasp. In
this way Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004) suggest that “chains” of
neurons in the inferior parietal lobe could facilitate action under-
standing through linking sequences of actions and goals (see also
Sinagaglia, 2009). Similar results have been found with human
adults (Iacoboni et al., 2005). These ﬁndings suggest that there
might be shared representations at higher-order levels that could
play a role in linking active experience and action understand-
ing. Thus, it is plausible that these representations may emerge in
development and support early developments in action under-
standing. Clearly, further research is needed to investigate this
possibility.
These open issues aside, the current ﬁndings support the
notion that self-produced experience is uniquely beneﬁcial for
action perception in the ﬁrst year of life. They shed light on the
nature of information gained from active experience with means-
end actions, indicating that the shift in one’s own attention to the
means or distal goal when learning to produce multi-step actions
is similarly reﬂected in infants’ perception of others’ means-end
actions.
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